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 Problem- framing in new innovation 
spaces: insights from software 
outsourcing
Rasmus Lema
14.1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades, outsourcing has had a major influence on the 
international division of labour. It is clear that it has been an important 
reason for the enormous build- up of production capabilities in the 
developing world, in particular in the export platforms of Asia. While 
there is increasing acknowledgement that the globalisation of research 
and development (R&D) and innovation is following produc-tion, it is 
not clear how this process unfolds and whether it extends to advanced 
innovation.
Until recently, the literature on outsourcing and global value chains 
maintained that only certain stages of the chain was outsourced to 
low- cost economies, mainly manufacturing and standardised services. 
Innovation activities, on the other hand, remained in so- called advanced 
economies (Mudambi, 2008). Outsourcing should merely strengthen sup-
pliers’ existing position in the global division of labour – where competi-
tive advantage is defined primarily by low cost. Innovation activities were 
‘detached’ from outsourced tasks and they remained centralised in and 
around lead firms and global buyers residing in advanced economies.
There is now increasing acknowledgement that outsourcing is changing 
in nature: firms are outsourcing activities, which they used to undertake 
in- house. They are farming out knowledge- intensive activities, including 
some innovation and R&D activities (Ernst, 2008; Jensen, 2009; Manning 
et al., 2008; Tate et al., 2009).
This chapter seeks insights by focusing on the global software- 
outsourcing industry and the supply platform in Bangalore (India), one of 
the most prominent cases of latecomer development in the global economy. 
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So far the literature on the software industry has tended to argue that the 
global division of labour is relatively stable (for example, Sharma, 2014). 
This is the key conclusion arising from studies that have been looking at 
‘hard indicators’, mainly the distribution of patented intellectual property 
and formal R&D expenditure (Arora, 2006; Arora et al., 2008; Dossani, 
2006). However, this conclusion is closely related to the division of tasks in 
distributed software development projects. Arora (2006: 400) describes the 
division of labour in outsourced software services as follows.
At the risk of oversimplification, software- related activities generally fall into 
one of three categories: design, coding, or maintenance. Design, which trans-
lates approximately into R&D and product development, has the highest value 
added of the three activities. Coding and maintenance may be thought of as 
analogous to production in other industries and consequently entail lower- end 
tasks. . . . Most of the functions offshored (especially to India) involve produc-
tion, while design has tended to remain local.
In other words, ‘production’ is outsourced, but ‘design’ is not. Core and 
strategically important innovative activities of OECD- based custom-
ers, R&D and product development, are typically perceived as ‘non- 
globalised’ and ‘bound’ to their home locations; they are thought to 
depend on localised and intricate linkages between firms and institutions 
in lead markets (see Wibe and Narula, 2002: 243). For example, Hoekstra 
(2006) argues that outsourcing relationships do not provide proximity to 
tacit knowledge and domain expertise because customers are at a physical 
and social distance from India. Furthermore, key constraints arise from 
the way outsourcing relationships are ‘modularised’ and structured.
According to D’Costa (2004: 57), ‘No firm wants to co- locate critical 
projects overseas due to coordination and communication problems . . . 
Each project/product is decomposed into self- contained modules, each 
with varying demand on tacit knowledge, making it possible to co- locate 
certain modules in certain places.’ Hence, because lead firms keep core 
competences in- house, the formation of innovative capabilities in India 
is constrained. ‘Export services that are outsourced to India are likely to 
remain non- critical adjuncts to central functions’ (D’Costa, 2003: 214). 
These were the conclusions derived by scholars studying software out-
sourcing ten years ago, so this chapter provides a critical discussion of 
whether this still holds true.
The chapter questions the widely held position – following Arora (2006) 
and D’Costa (2004) – that only lower- order activities are outsourced. To 
develop this understanding of emerging innovation spaces in India, the 
chapter adds to the literature on knowledge- intensive outsourcing (Jensen, 
2012; Manning et al., 2008; Massini and Miozzo, 2012; Tate et al., 2009) 
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and qualifies the argument that outsourcing relationships are unlikely to 
evolve beyond certain threshold levels because they do not provide sup-
plier proximity to tacit knowledge and domain expertise.
The key contribution of the chapter lies in specifying the circumstances 
in which innovative tasks may (or may not) be relocated from Western 
countries to India, thereby creating new spaces for innovation at the 
Indian end of the outsourcing relationship. It develops an understanding 
of how innovation spaces are created in India, by focusing upon problem- 
solving and problem- framing tasks in software development. The next 
section presents the conceptual framework for the study, combines this 
with a review of the relevant literature and specifies the knowledge gaps 
and questions explored in this chapter.
14.2  OUTSOURCING AND INNOVATION: 
INSIGHTS FROM THE LITERATURE
The nature of innovation activities that are potentially ‘transferred’ to 
emerging economies through outsourcing is debated because it has tra-
ditionally been seen as a cost- driven phenomenon. There is widespread 
agreement that access to ‘production’ capability at low cost is the main 
driver of offshore outsourcing, at least initially. However, outsourcing 
may evolve from production as the experience may give rise to a deepen-
ing of the outsourcing relationship. It may therefore be important to pay 
attention to many the intermediate stages between pure production activi-
ties, which depends only on the use of existing/given knowledge, and pure 
research, which is only concerned with the creation of knowledge.
Schmitz and Strambach (2009) have recently emphasised the need to 
recognise not only innovation activities that are loosely connected to pro-
duction (standalone innovation), but also those that are tightly connected 
to production (integrated innovation). In an outsourcing setting the latter 
could arise through the engagement of suppliers of manufacturing services 
in developing new products or processes. The key characteristic of this 
type of outsourcing is that it concentrates on the acquisition of a good or 
services but that some innovating by the supplier is required to provide 
this good or service. Despite the acknowledgement of the changing nature 
of outsourcing, most of the literature argues that dispersed innovation 
activities are of a second order.
Schmitz (2007) suggests that the notion of ‘advanced’ innovation in 
global value chains can be specified further. He argues that this type of 
innovation activity is ‘problem framing’. He draws on the modularity 
literature, which shows that tasks that integrating technology and systems 
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are critical steps in the innovation processes, even where the integrator 
(buyer) itself is a sub- system supplier in intermediate markets (Brusoni, 
2005; Brusoni et al., 2001; Pavitt, 2005). The failure to retain the integrat-
ing step in the innovation process could result in a situation where the 
buying firm no longer possesses the capabilities to incorporate new knowl-
edge and components effectively into its systems (Chesbrough, 2003: 191). 
For this reason, lead firms are much more readily prepared to outsource 
‘problem- solving’ innovation such as the design and engineering activities 
associated with the development of a system component. The situation 
that arises is that buyer firms keep problem- framing activities in- house (or 
close to home) and only disperse problem- solving activities to lower- cost 
suppliers in new economic regions (Schmitz and Strambach, 2009).
The hypothesis identified in the literature is thus that the ‘quality’ of 
outsourced innovative activities is limited to ‘problem solving’ (Schmitz 
and Strambach, 2009), ‘subsystem design’ (Chesbrough, 2003) or simply 
‘routine low- end innovation’ (Chen, 2008). Integrative capability in tech-
nical fields is strategic to buyer firms and that the strengthening of supplier 
capabilities in these realms is against their interests.
In manufacturing, this constellation is evident in the turnkey production 
network as found in Figure 1. In this type of network the problem framing 
tasks are undertaken by the brand name firm whereas the all remaining 
problem solving and production tasks are undertaken by the turn- key 
contractor. Adapted from Sturgeon (2002), there is a chain of three activi-
ties in turnkey production networks. Problem- framing includes activities 
like product R&D, product definition, functional design, form design and 
prototype fabrication. Problem- solving activities include process R&D, 
Brand Name Firm Turnkey Contractor
Turnkey
Network
Buyer Supplier
Organisations Activities
Problem framing ProductionProblem solving
Source: Adapted from Lema (2012a), based upon Sturgeon (1997)
Figure 14.1 Problem- framing and solving in turnkey production networks
McKELVEY 9781783475674 PRINT (M3619).indd   282 20/01/2015   10:07
Problem- framing in new innovation spaces  283
design for manufacturing and testing. Production includes manufacturing, 
component purchase and assembly.
Even in manufacturing but especially for software, the question is 
whether problem- framing and problem- solving activities can be sepa-
rated. Henderson and Clark (1990) distinguish between two different 
kinds of relevant knowledge. The first is knowledge of the system compo-
nents and the second is knowledge about the linkage between them, that 
is, architectural knowledge. In many industries, component knowledge 
is provided by suppliers, whereas architectural knowledge is retained by 
lead firms that function as system integrators. While such structures are 
particularly pronounced in industries dealing in highly complex products, 
some scholars have suggested that coordinating and integrating special-
ised knowledge is an important feature of innovation processes in general 
(Pavitt 2005). System integrators must have architectural knowledge as 
well as some degree of component knowledge in order to cope with tech-
nological change and product- level interdependencies. They must ‘know 
more than they make’ (Brusoni et al., 2001) and this requires the presence 
of in- house staff that possess a ‘higher level understanding’.
However, a number of scholars have pointed out that there are limits 
to decentralisation through modularity (Chesbrough, 2003; Ernst, 2005). 
Research on the outsourcing of printed circuit board manufacturing 
confirms that the overall design parameter typically remains in the hands 
of the customer because the requirements depend upon the electronics 
product into which it is inserted. A part of the design process is transferred 
to competent suppliers who then gain some scope to draw on and further 
develop distinct in- house competences (Lee and Chen, 2000). Ernst (2005) 
has shown that there are limits to modularity in chip design because of 
cognitive complexity. Technology change in this sector was unpredictable 
and changed faster than the ability to codify.
Modular production and innovation networks are dependent on what 
Baldwin and Clark (2006) call a pinch point in the flow of activities, that 
is, a codified and standardized transfer (hand- off) of design parameters 
and specifications. However, the establishment of such a pinch point 
can be difficult and costly. If a lead firm wants to place a transaction in 
a particular location it must define and find a way to measure the trans-
acted ‘objects’ (Baldwin, 2008). Significant costs can occur when the 
buyer undertakes product definition and specifies service- level agreement, 
process- approach, testing methods, and so on. Transactions between firms 
(externalisation) are more likely to occur where these costs are low. By 
implication, the outsourcing of standardised product components is feasi-
ble and straightforward when firms can rely on general industry standards 
and on clear specifications. The ability to codify becomes more difficult as 
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you proceed with functions that have knowledge- creating elements, such 
as design and engineering activities (D&E) or even R&D.
This has important implications for the division tasks between buyers 
and suppliers in outsourcing relationships in software. Dividing the 
value chain up into functions that are undertaken by separate firms (as 
in Figure 1) is relatively straightforward when lead firms have a strategy 
of ‘controlling the creative heart of the value chain, while outsourcing all 
other activities’ (Mudambi, 2008: 702). By contrast, ‘linkage economies’1 
may make such splitting up more difficult when lead firms adopt a more 
deliberate strategy to outsource innovation.2 In such cases lead firms may 
find it more efficient to bundle an increasingly large share of the value 
chain thread with supplier firms and work much more closely with sup-
pliers on the highly creation tasks. This typically means firm transactions 
cannot be fully specified ex ante. The ‘pinching’ of the inter- firm link is 
likely to be pushed to the limit, but the parties may invest in a (temporary) 
‘transaction- free zone’. Such zones are ‘physical, virtual, or social spaces 
where, by convention, a designated set of transfers occurs freely’ (Baldwin, 
2008: 181). Such zones are needed to facilitate complex, interdependent, 
and iterative transfers in the task network.
So far there are few studies that have examined modularity patterns 
in offshore software outsourcing empirically through case studies, even 
literature assumes that modularity dynamics pose threshold limits to 
the outsourcing of highly creative (problem- framing) work. The lit-
erature suggests more or less explicitly that this type of activity remain 
‘non- globalised’, not only in software outsourcing (Arora et al., 2008; 
Dossani, 2006) but sometimes also more widely in outsourcing gener-
ally (Mudambi, 2008; Schmitz, 2007; Sturgeon, 2002). To explore this 
assumption, the next section examines the character and evolution of 
outsourcing relationships and focuses on the outsourcing (or not) of 
problem- framing activities.
14.3  CASE STUDIES OF OUTSOURCED 
SOFTWARE: PROBLEM- SOLVING AND 
PROBLEM- FRAMING
Despite the ‘non- globalisation of innovation’ argument discussed in 
the introduction, recent literature suggests that more complex tasks 
are being outsourced from the rich world to emerging markets (Jensen, 
2009; Manning et al., 2008; Tate et al., 2009). Following upon this recent 
research, this chapter seeks to understand how more complex activities are 
outsourced as well as how and why this occurs in software. To do so, the 
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empirical analyses draws on the empirical analysis put forth in the previ-
ous section.
This chapter is based on a larger piece of work, specified in Lema 
(2012a). Table 14.1 outlines our conceptualization of problem- framing, 
problem- solving and knowledge- using activities in software development. 
The problem- framing activities identify what a product or system should 
do and broadly how it should do it. It relates to the step in the software 
project lifecycle that deals with requirement definition and high- level 
design, which mainly occurs in the inception phase of projects.
Analysing software along these lines is done by analysing three different 
buyer–supplier relationships in the case studies3 to maximise the compara-
tive element of the chapter.
There is a primary software firm focused solely on the development of 
software systems. This is Digital Media Networks and the outsourcing of 
product development (OPD) to Aditi Technologies. There is a second-
ary software firm with an origin as an in- house software developer for a 
large manufacturing enterprise. This is Automobile IT and the outsourc-
ing of custom application development (CAD) to MindTree Consulting. 
There is also an electronics firms producing and purchasing software for 
its hardware products. This is Telecommunication Corporation and the 
outsourcing of engineering services (ESO) to Sasken Communication 
Technologies. The buyer firms are all incorporated in Europe or the US 
and the supplier firms in India.
14.3.1 Digital Media Network and Aditi Technologies
Digital Media Networks is a privately funded US start- up company in the 
online digital media business. It was established in 2002 with the idea of a 
media service engine for legal digital content sharing. Aditi Technologies, 
was established in 1994 by entrepreneurs returning from the US. The 
chief executive officer (CEO) came from a position as a general manager 
of a division in Microsoft. During the 1990s the firm concentred on 
developing its own customer relationship management (CRM) product, 
Table 14.1 Chain of activities in software development
Problem framing Requirement analysis and definition; high- level design
Problem solving Low- level design
Production Programming (coding and testing); deployment
Source: Lema (2012a)
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Talisma, while also supplying services, including technology support for 
 independent software vendors (ISVs). In the early 2000s the CRM product 
business was spun off, so the firm could concentrate solely on outsourced 
product development. Today the firm has 650 employees and has acquired 
capabilities for end- to- end new product development.
The founder and CEO of Digital Media Networks previously had a 
career in Microsoft in which he was a senior sales leader. The firm was 
‘born open’ with a complex business model and revenue- sharing agree-
ments. As a business- to- business (B2B) company, this firm focuses its 
managerial resources on sales, network alliances and strategic manage-
ment. A strong network of industry contacts helped the CEO to build the 
business and the various commercial and technical networks it entails. The 
media service engine was based on Microsoft technology and standards, 
content was provided by record label companies such as Sony, Universal 
and Warner, third- party providers such as PayPal provided critical com-
ponents and outlets were provided by Microsoft Media Player and eBay. 
The company was the exclusive alliance partner for powering eBay’s foray 
into the music download business.
The decision to outsource the entire development of the system to 
an offshore provider was an easy one – it was inherent in the business 
plan. This decision had been made for three primary reasons. First, it 
was believed that time to market for the flagship solution was crucial 
for the success of firm. However, it was felt that it would not be possible 
to quickly build a team in- house with sufficient knowledge and experi-
ence as such a team was not easy to assemble in the US. Second, it was 
important to have the ability to ramp up and down effortlessly once 
the major phase of creation was complete and to ramp up again for the 
second release. Such flexibility could not be achieved with an in- house 
team. The third reason was the combination of rich experience and prices 
comparable or below US prices. Most important, the firm was attracted 
by the ability to get inputs to the project from an experienced product 
development firm.
As the very foundation of Digital Media’s business, the solution provided 
by Aditi was mission critical. The initial requirement had been described in 
just an eight- page ‘visioning document’. This document formed the basis 
for proposal building and preparatory activities. Requirements were then 
settled during a one- week meeting at the Digital Media office. Thus, Aditi 
was closely involved in the requirements- definition stage as pertaining to 
the technical solution. As explained by the CEO of Digital Media, some 
of the requirements came from the supplier’s ability to envisage usage sce-
narios. When asked about whether there was a concern that the supplier 
would not understand the end- user scenario he replied: 
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There were things they thought of that we missed. This Group at Aditi, there 
were many things they brought to the table that added value. I would like to 
think that we thought of most of the usage cases, but there were things they 
brought to the table that we hadn’t even thought about. So I wouldn’t say that 
they don’t understand the consumer situation, again there were many cases 
were they did add value there (Digital Media informant).
For Digital Media, the focus on sales and the management of a new busi-
ness model were enabled by a far- reaching outsourcing strategy in the 
sphere of technology. It was decided very early to outsource the develop-
ment of the core technology platform to Aditi. The availability of the sup-
plier’s R&D services allowed for an operational business model focused 
on customer- facing activities and management of alliance relationships. 
This was dependent on the supplier’s depth of competences in the involved 
technology domains, which could aid technology decisions for the system 
as well as the ability to provide end- to- end solutions from vision to launch.
The radical outsourcing strategy was not adopted without problems. At 
the outset, the leadership in Digital Media had envisaged a business model 
with no in- house technical resources. This strategy needed to be revised. 
The main complicating factors were about communication between 
non- technical (buyer- side) and technical (supplier- side) people in the dis-
tributed work environment. The division of labour which was originally 
envisaged did not work. The buyer came to realise that a certain amount 
of overlap was needed. As the CEO explained, ‘you need to have technical 
people on your side who completely understand the vision of the project’ 
in order to effectively manage the relationship with the offshore provider. 
Therefore, an in- house technical team was gradually built to improve the 
work process for the release of the second version of the system.
14.3.2 Automobile IT and MindTree Consulting
For more than 30 years, until 1998, Auto IT was the in- house information 
technology (IT) division of a European auto manufacturer now special-
ising in trucks and buses. In 2001, the firm acquired two truck manu-
facturers (located in France and US) and the IT services divisions were 
consolidated in Auto IT, which had become a wholly- owned subsidiary. 
The IT organisation was to play a new role, offering its services in the inter-
national marketplace for software development services. In the same year, 
the organisation initiated a competitive sourcing programme and estab-
lished relationships with suppliers in Poland and India, in order to reduce 
costs, speed up deliveries and learn from skilled partners. The outsourcing 
practice grew rapidly and the customer base expanded beyond the capac-
ity of the organisation; it was therefore clear that a strategy of internal 
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 competence transition was needed. This strategy had two main elements. 
First, Auto IT needed to establish a new role for the organisation, one that 
was closer to the customer and with more of the deliveries managed by 
suppliers. Second, it needed internal employees – now perceived as ‘high- 
cost employees’ – to move up the value chain, ‘out of the technical areas 
and over to the business side of things’ (Auto IT informant).
A key element in the definition of requirements was the experience 
that was gained from collaborating with MindTree Consulting, a spin- off 
from Wipro. MindTree was established in 1999 by a former Wipro leader 
with the explicit aim of creating a knowledge- intensive software solutions 
company. The firm initially latched on to the US internet economy by 
providing e- business integration services on the enterprise side, but soon 
after inception the market took a downturn. As a survival strategy the 
slump was used to ‘build processes for the future’ in areas such as tools, 
methodologies and quality in the more traditional customised applica-
tion development (CAD) space. Once this business line picked up, a key 
mechanism for the deepening of domain knowledge and related processes 
was to develop a strong knowledge management culture and system. 
Furthermore, MindTree was concerned with following in the footsteps 
of the established firms by becoming a ‘global company’ by instituting 
a strong presence in customer locations. Top management and founders 
drove this process as an opportunity for building deeper domain compe-
tences in the CAD segment as one of key vehicles for upgrading in this 
segment.
According to the CEO of Auto IT, the relationship with MindTree 
‘is the only true partnership of Auto IT’. Already in 2001, Auto IT had 
engaged MindTree to build and maintain a new global dealer management 
system (DMS) for its trucks division. The system was eventually rolled out 
in 18 countries and was perceived as ‘mission critical’. MindTree’s inde-
pendent development of the system and the effective building of new skills 
showed Auto IT that increased outsourcing to capable suppliers could 
support a new growth strategy.
Over time, MindTree has become more closely involved in the out-
sourced projects, and the supplier is involved in complex tasks in the 
software development lifecycle. It no longer merely develops systems to 
Auto IT’s specifications, but also participates in the development of those 
specifications by finding resolutions to user requests.
A good example was the development of a CRM sales tool for a leading 
trucks manufacturer. With external financing, this was a critical project 
with high visibility. The decision to engage MindTree in the end- to- 
end development of the system was rooted in a ‘critical situation’. The 
packaged- legacy CRM system for pre- owned trucks was being phased 
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out by the provider, and the customer urgently needed a new system in 
its place. However, the proposal initially developed by Auto IT, which 
depended on in- house resources for the critical phases of the project, had a 
budget and a schedule that was far beyond what the customer was willing 
to accept. After deliberations among the board, it was decided to chal-
lenge MindTree by giving them key responsibility for the project, in order 
to avoid the loss of an important business opportunity. However, there 
was also a more fundamental reason that was to do with the difficulty of 
transferring complex knowledge. As an informant in MindTree explained:
They wanted to develop the system themselves and then involve us in the next 
phase of back- end integration. That was the initial plan they presented to the 
management. But [the executive vice president and head of Auto IT’s ‘region 
international’] felt that this was not right. He knew us very well. He said: ‘You 
say that you will involve MindTree in Phase Two. But when it comes to Phase 
Two, you will come back and say that MindTree does not have the business 
knowledge of Phase One, so we cannot involve them. So don’t make that 
mistake. Involve MindTree from the beginning.’ That is when the whole plan 
changed. Later on they told us that it was one of the best decisions they had 
taken.
MindTree was able to draw on its experience of working on and develop-
ing CRM systems for customers in other industrial domains. However, 
MindTree used this ‘generic knowledge’ in this business- critical project 
within Auto. It was able to do so because of the close relationship between 
the two firms. A full- time MindTree manager is posted permanently on 
site, with access to the entire buyer organisation. Key personnel in the 
supplier firm have accumulated customer- specific knowledge and compe-
tences incrementally, which has enabled them to add value and provide 
Auto IT with new ideas capabilities for innovation in new projects.
14.3.3  Telecommunication Corporation and Sasken Communication 
Technologies
In the early 1990s when Telecom Corp introduced its first GSM (Global 
System for Mobile Communications) handsets to the market, the company 
was able to undertake all processes in- house, even the design of its own 
chips. As an industrial conglomerate, Telecom Corp could internalise all 
stages of mobile phone development, including R&D, design, assembly 
and manufacturing. However, over time, this strategy was abandoned. 
Throughout the 1990s and continuing in the 2000s it sold off parts of the 
corporation to focus on key processes, using the newly formed firms as 
suppliers. During the 1990s, the value of purchases grew three times faster 
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than the value of sales. During the 2000s, the firm consciously worked to 
reduce R&D spending and rely more on an external network of providers. 
A key driver of this process of externalisation is the increasing complex-
ity of technologies and supply chains, factors that make it impossible 
to undertake all innovation processes in- house. A distinction developed 
between elements and processes that were ‘core’ and ‘context’, respec-
tively. The latter included what the firm referred to as ‘commodity R&D 
and technology’, which was now acquired in the market.
A fraction of this contextual R&D was provided by Indian firm Sasken 
Communication Technologies, a firm specialised in IP development and 
outsourced engineering services for the handset industry. Established in 
1989, Sasken was one of the firms hit severally by the technology slump 
of the early 2000s due to its dependence on the US ‘dot com’ technology 
sector. The slump spurred a refocusing of the firm from the personal com-
puter (PC) domain to the mobile communications domain. According to 
informants, the downturn was used to make investments for the future 
in this area. The relationship with Telecom Corp reflects the firm’s new 
profile as a pure player in this area.
For instance, Telecom Corp made some use of video- application and 
codec licensing from Sasken. These are subcomponents and commodity 
inputs. As stated by an informant in Telecom Corp: ‘There has been some 
licensing of certain application and features, but they are not really key 
components.’
The relationship between the two firms was strengthened in 2005 when 
the venture capital arm of Telecom Corp made a US$3 million investment 
in Sasken. Despite this, Sasken was unable to license out or work on more 
critical technology and processes for Telecom Corp. Sasken had devel-
oped core applications such as an integrated multimedia suite, but the sup-
plier was unable to sell this to Telecom Corp (Telecom Corp informant):
The problem for Sasken is that multimedia happens to be one of the key areas 
for [Telecom Corp]. . . . In order for Sasken to sell their subsystem it would have 
required that [Telecom Corp] makes a decision to withdraw its own in- house 
developed subsystem and replace it with Sasken’s and start paying money to 
Sasken for the licensing and the further development. The control over that 
subsystem would not have been inside [Telecom Corp]. . . . There are certain 
areas there in which [Telecom Corp] would like to keep the control in its own 
hands. This multimedia subsystem and multimedia applications and services 
are those things that are not likely to be outsourced or licensed from outside.
Sasken was not the only Indian firm that supplied Telecom Corp with out-
sourced engineering services. Wipro, a major Indian service provider, was 
a key source of outsourcing and staff augmentation services for  particular 
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Telecom Corp projects. Wipro was a part of the R&D supply chain in 
a major way. However, certain core hardware and software design and 
testing services (including radio frequency testing) were not outsourced to 
this supplier. As an informant stated, there are certain types of process and 
knowledge that Telecom Corp keeps under European control. The reason 
was a concern within Telecom Corp about dependence on this large firm 
for critical resources. There were certain types of knowledge that it did not 
want to put in the hands of this supplier. Rather it sourced these services 
from a small number of domestic firms. Most of these adopted ‘follow 
sourcing’ strategies, and went global in order to service Telecom Corp in 
new markets such as China and India. This led to Sasken becoming part of 
the innovation chain, but there were clear limits to the involvement.
Telecom Corp had a very close relationship with Wireless Hightech, a 
European supplier of design and radio frequency testing services. Leading 
managers in Wireless Hightech had an employment history in Telecom 
Corp. However, Wireless was not globally oriented and did not have the 
size to venture abroad as was required by Telecom Corp. For this reason, 
Wireless was put under pressure to merge with Sasken in order to service 
Telecom Corp in Europe and globally (in India and Mexico). As a result, 
Sasken acquired Wireless in 2006. This act of supply- chain coordination 
exercised by Telecom Corp was initiated for two primary reasons. The 
first was to ensure that the particular engineering service capabilities 
of Wireless could be scaled up globally. The second was to create more 
balance in the supply network and to develop a degree of control over 
certain R&D services outsourced to Indian organisations. On the other 
hand, this reconfiguration of the supply chain provided Sasken with an 
opportunity to move into new competence areas, such as advanced hard-
ware testing, which had previously been out of bounds for Indian suppli-
ers. However, it did not enable the firm to move into mission- critical R&D 
such as high- level design services or a licensing implementation service for 
key components such as multimedia applications.
14.3.4 Analysis and Insights from the Case Studies
A series of points from the analysis and insight are discussed here. A 
first point is that outsourcing of problem- framing activities does occur 
but is confined to software services. In the software services industries, 
represented by Digital Media Network and Auto IT, suppliers are now 
often invited to participate in requirement- definition – problem- framing 
 activities – in a substantial way. In the primary software industry of 
Digital Media networks it relates to the identification of user needs (for 
example, from market and customer surveys) and the capturing of these in 
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the  definition of functional specifications. The same is true for the second-
ary software industry of Auto IT, but in this setting there is a much more 
direct relationship with users. The insights from both cases run counter 
to the extant hypothesis that such problem- framing activities are kept at 
home in buyer organisations.
This finding is specific to the software buyer segments as opposed to 
the electronics hardware segment. As the Telecom Corp case illustrated, 
electronics and telecom firms mainly outsource problem- solving and inno-
vation support activities, thus confirming largely to the extant hypothesis 
identified in earlier sections. Indeed, the analysis of Telecom Corp and 
Sasken illustrate that engineering services provided in India tend to feed 
into highly coordinated networks and innovation processes in which these 
Indian service providers play a specialised and bounded role. In Telecom 
Corp problem framing is associated with overall product architecture 
and systems integrations. The firm provides carefully defined and limited 
spaces in which suppliers can operate.
The second point is that certain elements of problem- framing are 
becoming less strategic to buyers of software services. Outsourced prob-
lems helped certain buyers to tackle particular challenges define more 
narrow core competences for their own organisations. This does not 
mean that the distinction between strategic and non- strategic activi-
ties has vanished. It has shifted to somewhere else. The key innovation 
processes! – those that provide the most value in new business models 
and ensure future competiveness – are becoming non- technical. Instead 
of focusing on product and systems development, managers focus on 
the customer interface. Internal resources are deployed in the areas 
that enhance user- knowledge and sales capability; they are increasingly 
focused on managing external relationships and on capturing rent from 
new business models.
This means that new upper boundaries emerge for what the buyers 
are prepared to outsource. This was clearly expressed by buyers. As an 
informant in Auto IT stated: ‘We do not want to bring in someone else 
to take the layer between us and the customer.’ Controlling access to the 
customer is increasingly vital. Even though suppliers may contribute sub-
stantially to functional requirements, the lead firm are strongly positioned 
as mediators and relationship anchor- points forward and backwards in 
the chain. Thus, the question arises for firm management, namely whether 
firms are willing to let go of component knowledge (problem- solving), 
while seeking to retain architectural knowledge (problem- framing). In this 
scenario, architectural knowledge is what matters and knowledge spillover 
arising from buyer–supplier interactions is a dangerous threat. However, 
when the rent- generating processes move forwards towards the user, the 
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strategic importance of architectural knowledge is reduced in the services 
segment.
The third point is that problem- framing activities and system develop-
ment activities are often outsourced in a bundle. Key differences across 
the case studies relate to the bundling of value chain tasks. Where inno-
vative services are bought on a standalone basis, they do generally not 
extend beyond problem- solving. Where production and innovation tasks 
are integrated there is a wider scope for or incentive to draw the supplier 
into problem- framing elements of the development process. Based on the 
analysis of the case studies, Figure 14.2 illustrates the difference between 
the standalone and the integrated supplier setting in this regard.
Standalone innovative activities are typically undertaken within the 
realm of new product development. It is therefore easy to assume 
that these are ‘most proximate’ to problem framing. However, a 
loose connectedness as detected in software outsourcing by electron-
ics firms means that highly differentiated roles – for example, systems 
 integration!vs modular component provision – can easily be assigned to 
User mediator
Problem framing
Problem solving
Production 
Integrated supplier
Integrated
configuration
(software segment)
Systems integrator
Buyer Supplier
Standalone
configuration
(electronics segment)
Problem framing Problem solving
Production
Buyer Supplier
Innovation supplier
Production supplier
Organisations Activities
Source: Lema (2012a)
Figure 14.2  Problem- framing in standalone and integrated innovation 
outsourcing
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separate  organisations. Typically, there are relatively modest interactive 
requirements despite a high degree of system interdependency. The inter-
face between the software component and the overall product is specified 
by the overall product design and the technical standards. The buyer is 
overseeing the design of the overall product (for example, a chip or wire-
less device) and defines the functional requirements of the component. 
These specify the behaviour of the component and the interface (exter-
nal design). The supplier is left with responsibility for non- functional 
requirements (such as performance, security and reliability) and internal 
design.
Conversely, because integrated innovation activities are undertaken in 
tight connection with production (that is, implementation) it is easy to 
assume that these are the ‘furthest away’ from problem- framing. However, 
this is not the case. This is because some problem- solving activities are dif-
ficult to codify in the primary and secondary software industry. If buyers 
want to outsource problem- solving activities, they typically need to open 
up for elements of the problem- framing processes. Buyer firms expanded 
the outsourced value- chain thread from implementation activities all the 
way into the realm of problem- framing.
The modular view on outsourcing suggests that while specialised com-
ponent knowledge can be acquired externally, lead firms are likely to 
retain architectural knowledge and integrative capacity in- house (Baldwin 
and Clark, 2006; Pavitt, 2005). However, the analysis above suggests that 
this point may have been exaggerated when it comes to software. Or, to 
be more precise, it suggests that the modular view only applies in certain 
segments of the software outsourcing industry where integrated suppliers 
provide a full range of innovation and development functions.
The fourth point is that limits to codification are a driver of outsourc-
ing of problem- framing activities. It is not always possible to draw a clear 
dividing line between problem- solving and problem- framing.4 It is this 
limit to codifiability, and the resulting needs for buyer–supplier interac-
tion, that explains why co- framing of requirements was widespread in 
the tightly connected relationships that were studied in this research. 
Sometimes requirements and specifications have not been fully fleshed out 
at the point of engagements and sometimes they are virtually impossible 
to work out at this point. More importantly, they are virtually impossible 
to relay to a supplier firm.
Business analysts and software architects construct the high- level design 
and the specifications at this stage. They need to write these specifica-
tions in a highly detailed form if the buyer intends to transfer them to 
a supplier who will take over during the coding phase. This process of 
codification of requirement is what Baldwin and Clark (2006) refer to as 
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the costly process of ‘pinching’. However, these costs can be reduced and 
externalised by involving the supplier in the elaboration phase. Because 
the supplier firm performs high- level design activities as well as execution, 
it increases the efficiency of each of these activities. The supplier relies on 
the ‘cognitive proximity’ of onsite staff and on highly developed methods 
for the within- firm ‘transfer’ of these specifications to the execution team 
in the offshore development centre.
In highly evolved outsourcing relationships, the buyer needs to draw 
supplier staff into the architecture and sometimes even the ‘vision’ of the 
project. Hence they take part in the inception phase, and activities in this 
phase are very difficult to codify. A pinch- point is virtually impossible to 
establish and the inter- firm connection becomes relational. They create 
limited transaction- free zones by placing supplier staff onsite, thereby 
reducing the problems that arise in the organisational- geographical nexus 
of advanced offshore outsourcing. These zones typically exist for a limited 
period; but occasionally they are created on a permanent basis so that 
the suppliers can obtain a deep level of understanding of the vision and 
context of consecutive projects. They are drawing suppliers into the ‘crea-
tive heart of the value chain’, not only to externalise the cost of pinching 
but also to leverage supplier assets in higher- order activities.
14.4 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
There are now several strands of literature that stress the centrality of out-
sourcing in the debate about the global distribution of innovation activities 
(Jensen, 2009; Manning et al., 2008; Maskell et al., 2007). Yet, the more 
precise extent and importance of outsourcing is a matter of controversy, 
not least because of conceptual ambiguity. The challenge confronting the 
researcher is to identify particular hypotheses, provide definitions and find 
ways to examine them. This is what this chapter has sought to do. The aim 
of the chapter was to explore the widely held hypothesis that lead firms 
keep advanced innovation in- house (or closes to home) while dispersing 
only tasks of a second order. It has drawn on evidence from the global 
software outsourcing industry that connects lead firms in OECD countries 
with suppliers in Bangalore, India. While recent literature suggests that 
services outsourcing is becoming more knowledge- intensive, there is con-
troversy about how deep these relationships and complexity goes and why.
The framework proposes to equate advanced innovation with those ele-
ments of software development that are ‘problem- framing’; these elements 
define what the software should do and how it should do it. One of the 
main results of the case study research was that some buyer are  beginning 
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to open up the problem- framing process, relying on key inputs from 
Indian providers of software services.
The case studies showed how IT departments and independent soft-
ware vendors build on their experience with the outsourcing of software 
design activities to take a step further and give suppliers the responsibility 
in the entire chain of software development activities, sometimes includ-
ing those that define the system or product. Outsourced activities are no 
longer merely non- critical adjuncts to central functions. Indian firms even 
become involved in specifying (framing) and solving ‘mission critical’ 
problems.
This chapter has also cast light on the issue of why and how innovative 
tasks are shifting to the supply base, including critical observations about 
salient conceptual and causal connections that are central to the literature 
on outsourcing and innovation.
The literature stresses that offshore outsourcing has emerged as a cost- 
driven phenomenon, and that the scope innovation is constrained by the 
prominence of activities with high labour requirements (Mudambi, 2008). 
It is commonly assumed that labour- intensive activities have fixed or 
unfavourable learning exponentials and that such activities do not provide 
access to crucial domain expertise and tacit knowledge which ‘sticks’ to 
customer locations. The cases in this chapter confirmed that ‘routine’ 
production tasks are important, but this did not limit the scope for further 
capability building as discussed in the introduction. There is considerable 
scope for innovation as an incremental extension of routine outsourcing 
low- cost countries.
Three main findings relate the specific case of software outsourcing 
from US and Europe to India to the broader issue of the development and 
flows to specific innovation spaces.
One finding is that in a rapidly changing world it is not feasible to 
assign ‘fixed values’ to categories such as ‘strategic’ and ‘non- strategic’. 
Architectural knowledge is only strategic in certain circumstances and it 
is a fallacy to view the limits to outsourcing as given. The chapter has sug-
gested that that supplier firms have moved into the chamber of ‘advanced’ 
innovation activity – not despite the interest of buyers but often because 
of the interests of buyers.
Second, it appears that the constraints of modularity in products and 
organisation may have been over- emphasised. Despite, the initial focus 
on ‘low end’ tasks and less critical projects, outsourcing relationships 
seems to have provided ‘sufficient’ knowledge and domain expertise for 
the subsequent outsourcing of higher- end tasks and more critical projects. 
The inability to fully codify tasks often means that even if systems have 
a modular architecture, face- to- face interaction is necessary. Iterative 
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information flows are forged with the presence of onsite personnel (actual 
proximity) supplemented with new technologies that enable frequent and 
high- bandwidth communication across geographical distance (virtual 
proximity).
Finally, linkage economies can be achieved through the integration 
of production and design tasks in the outsourced value chain thread. 
‘Integrated innovation outsourcing’ reduces the substantial coordination 
costs associated with up- front investments undertaken during the initial 
phases of software projects. Buyers reduce and externalise the substantial 
tasks of detailed codification and communication by drawing supplier 
closer to the vision of the project. There are cumulative dynamics arising 
from initial outsourcing of mundane tasks, which may lead to further 
rounds of more advanced outsourcing of innovation.
These three findings suggest that the roads used to redistribute increas-
ingly deep innovative activities are paved by global production networks 
and lead firms in these networks. But redistribution does not occur auto-
matically. It requires active efforts in supplier firms, including internal 
investments, project organisation or learning and external acquisition of 
knowledge to meet new demands.
A crucial question is how this deepening will affect the economic power 
balance between the current demand- bases (the loci of buyers and lead 
firms in OECD countries) and the new innovation spaces in China and 
India. Will the further outsourcing of innovative tasks create mutually 
beneficial relationships whereby buyers shift to higher value activities, 
shedding more and more complex activities to Indian suppliers, but 
keeping them in a complementary and subordinate function? Or will it 
create relationships that entail risks for the buyers who may eventually 
lose their competitive edge in problem- framing and customer- related 
activities?
NOTES
1. Linkage economies arise from connections between the production functions associated
with different activities in the value chain. Mudambi (2008) argues that if linkage econo-
mies are high, lead firms are likely to opt for offshore foreign direct investment (FDI)
rather than outsourcing. Information flows with highly complex knowledge are easier to
forge between units within a single firm than between disparate enterprises.
2. For example, if these lead firms adopt more or less ‘open’ business models (Lema, 2010).
3. These cases are drawn from a larger study of 36 ‘critical events’ for attainment of inno-
vation capability in ten Indian software firms. A major task for the analysis of these
events was the analysis of external sources of innovation. It is the retracing of customer
linkages that forms the basis of the material presented in this chapter. Interviews were
made in the buyer firms in order to understand driving forces and circumstances for
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outsourcing of different types of activities across the software value chain. In total, more 
than 100 interviews were conducted covering both the supply and demand side using 
semi- structured questionnaires. Most buyer firms were therefore interviewed by phone. 
However, European buyers were interviewed face to face. Names of buyer firms (but 
not supplier firms) are anonymous as to adhere to non- disclosure agreements. Further 
details on methodology are provided in (Lema, 2012a, 2012b).
4. The distinction between problem- solving and problem- framing is not in the buyers’
minds. Their language was vague referring to (in CAD) ‘the tasks of high- cost employ-
ees’ and ‘the business side of things’. In most cases they want a specific and often pressing
problem solved, and this then becomes a route to ‘value- chain creep’ in which suppliers
enter the loci of problem- framing activity.
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